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Infrastructure made a net contribution of around 1 
percentage point to Angola’s improved per capita growth 
performance in recent years, despite unreliable power 
supplies and poor roads, which each holding back 
growth by 0.2 percentage points. Raising the country’s 
infrastructure endowment to that of the region’s middle-
income countries (MICs) could boost Angola’s annual 
growth by about 2.9 percentage points.
   As a resource-rich, postconflict country, Angola has 
shown an exceptionally strong commitment to financing 
the reconstruction and expansion of its infrastructure. It 
has recently expanded its generation capacity, embarked 
on an ambitious multibillion-dollar road rehabilitation 
program, begun to make investments aimed at easing 
congestion at the Port of Luanda, and embarked upon 
an ambitious rehabilitation program for urban water 
systems.
This paper is a product of the Sustainable Development Unit, the Africa Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World 
Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at vfoster@worldbank.org.  
   Numerous challenges remain, however. Angola needs 
to upgrade its electricity transmission and distribution 
infrastructure, expand its urban water-supply system, 
improve efficiency at the Port of Luanda, and make 
policy and regulatory adjustments across the board.
Angola presently spends around $4.3 billion per year 
on infrastructure, with $1.3 billion lost to inefficiencies. 
After taking sectoral allocations and inefficiencies into 
account, a modest funding gap of $115 million per year 
remains, which could be largely eliminated by focusing 
on lower-cost water and sanitation options. Angola’s 
infrastructure needs are manageable relative to its fast-
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Infrastructure made a net contribution of around 1 percentage point to Angola’s improved per capita 
growth performance in recent years, despite unreliable power supplies and roads each holding back 
growth by 0.2 percentage points. Raising the country’s infrastructure endowment to that of the region’s 
middle-income countries (MICs) could boost annual growth by about 2.9 percentage points.  
As a resource-rich postconflict country, Angola has shown an exceptionally strong commitment to 
financing the reconstruction and expansion of its infrastructure, which was severely damaged and 
neglected during the country’s long civil war. The end of the war coincided with soaring oil prices, 
bringing in the necessary petroleum revenues to fund such a reconstruction effort. A financing agreement 
with China, backed by future petroleum revenues, further expanded the resource envelope for investment. 
Thus, in the space of a few years, Angola has expanded its generation capacity by 400 MW (a 50 percent 
increase), embarked on an ambitious multibillion-dollar road rehabilitation program, begun to make 
investments aimed at easing congestion at the Port of Luanda, and begun the rehabilitation program for 
urban water systems. All these are significant steps. 
Numerous challenges remain, however. Many of them involve going beyond investment to strengthen 
and optimize the policy and institutional environment for infrastructure provision. 
Despite the expansion of power-generation capacity, deficient transmission and distribution 
infrastructure prevents electricity from flowing to customers, and the reliability of supply remains very 
poor. A complex web of subsidies and operational deficiencies makes Angola’s power sector among the 
least efficient in Africa, hemorrhaging resources equivalent to 1.6 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP).  
Angola’s water utilities have been unable to cope with burgeoning urbanization to a point where 
about 40 percent of the urban population relies on largely untreated water supplied by vendors. This has 
disastrous public health consequences, leaving Angola with one of the highest rates of diarrheal disease in 
the world. For reasons that seem difficult to justify, Angola’s utility tariffs are among the highest in 
Africa, at $2.30 per cubic meter of water, while vendors charge $4–$20 for untreated supplies. 
Serious congestion problems at Angola’s main international gateway—the Port of Luanda—have 
made its facilities so costly and frustrating to use that traffic is increasingly diverting to Walvis Bay in 
Namibia, more than 2,000 kilometers distant. 
Addressing Angola’s infrastructure challenges and providing a basic infrastructure platform within 
the course of a decade would require sustained expenditure of $2.1 billion per year over the next decade. 
Some 70 percent of the required spending is associated with capital investments, with the remaining 30 
percent is needed for operational and maintenance spending. Almost one-third of the total spending needs 
are related to the power sector, followed by the water supply and sanitation sectors. The effort that 
Angola would need to make to meet its infrastructure needs is equivalent to 7 percent of its GDP, 
significantly below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (14.5 percent).  
Angola already spends around $4.3 billion per year on infrastructure, equivalent to 14 percent of its 
GDP. Spending is about double estimated needs due to the fact that the government is pursuing an ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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accelerated program of infrastructure reconstruction and hence is spending a massive $2.9 billion a year 
in that sector alone. As a result, Angola’s capital spending on infrastructure is heavily skewed toward 
transport, which accounts for some 70 percent of the total. In contrast to many of its peers, and reflecting 
buoyant petroleum revenues, Angola’s infrastructure investment is predominantly funded by domestic 
fiscal resources. China is by far the most significant source of external finance, with only modest private 
capital inflows and negligible overseas direct investment (ODA).  
Remarkably, some $1.3 billion is being lost to inefficiencies of various kinds, equivalent to almost 5 
percent of GDP. By far the largest culprit is the power sector, which hemorrhages $700 million annually, 
primarily as a result of massive underpricing ($475 million) as well as some other factors. The 
underexecution of capital budgets is also exceptionally high in Angola, at $573 million annually, and 
primarily reflects difficulties in the implementation of the country’s huge road investment program 
(accounting for $401 million of this total). By taking suitable policy measures, Angola could recapture 
these lost resources for investment in its infrastructure. 
Given the urgent pressure to reconstruct Angola’s infrastructure platforms, there is some evidence 
that decisions have not always been optimal. For example, the expansion of generation capacity has not 
been matched by reinforcements in transmission and distribution that would allow the power to flow 
through to end users. And the scale of Angola’s road investment program seems to have outstripped the 
implementation capacity of the key sector institutions. There is also evidence that the water and sanitation 
sector may not yet have received as much attention as it deserves. 
After taking sectoral allocations and inefficiencies into account, a modest funding gap of $115 million 
per year remains, almost entirely relating to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) for the water and sanitation sector. Nevertheless, this funding gap could be largely eliminated by 
focusing service expansion on lower cost water and sanitation options. Furthermore, with such a high 
spending envelope overall, there looks to be some scope for the reallocation of resources toward water 
and sanitation.  
While Angola’s infrastructure reconstruction needs are large in absolute terms, they look manageable 
relative to the size of the country’s fast-growing economy. Moreover, Angola has amply demonstrated its 
commitment to channeling significant volumes of petroleum rents toward infrastructure development. 
Consequently, Angola is one of a very few African countries that does not face a significant infrastructure 
funding gap, as long as the country is able to make headway in reducing its massive efficiency gap. In the 
medium term, Angola could potentially attract much more private finance for infrastructure than it has to 
date, thereby helping to liberate public funds for other pressing social needs. 
The continental perspective 
The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) has gathered and analyzed extensive data on 
infrastructure in more than 40 Sub-Saharan countries, including Angola. The results have been presented 
in reports covering different areas of infrastructure—information and communication technology (ICT), 
irrigation, power, transport, water and sanitation—and different policy areas, including investment needs, 
fiscal costs, and sector performance. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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This report presents the key AICD findings for Angola, allowing the country’s infrastructure situation 
to be benchmarked against that of its African peers. Given that Angola is a low-income resource-rich 
country, two sets of African benchmarks will be used to evaluate Angola’s situation: fragile low-income 
countries and resource-rich countries. Detailed comparisons will also be made with immediate regional 
neighbors in the Southern African Development Community (SADC).  
Several methodological issues should be borne in mind. First, because of the cross-country nature of 
data collection, a time lag is inevitable. The period covered by the AICD for Angola runs from 2005 to 
2009. But financial data for comparator countries typically cover an earlier period, 2001–06, and are 
averaged to smooth out fluctuations, while technical data are reported for 2006. Second, in order to make 
comparisons  across  countries,  it  was  necessary  to  standardize  the  indicators  and  analysis  so  that 
everything was done on a consistent basis. This means that some of the indicators presented here may be 
slightly different from those that are routinely reported and discussed at the country level. 
Why infrastructure matters 
In recent years, Angola’s economy has been among the fastest growing in Africa. Looking ahead, the 
country’s GDP is projected to rise by 6.5 percent in 2011, with oil-sector growth of 3.8 percent and non-
oil-sector growth of 8.1 percent (IMF 2011). A 27-year war that ended in 2002 ravaged the country and 
destroyed most of its economic infrastructure. Many roads, rails, and bridges were mined and obliterated; 
surviving infrastructure is dilapidated after years of neglect. Following the war’s end, the government 
turned its attention to the reconstruction of the country. And indeed, for the period 2003 to 2007, 
improvements in infrastructure added 1 percentage point to the per capita growth rate, which is substantial 
even if not as high as many countries in Africa (figure 1a). This boost to growth came predominately 
from the ICT revolution. Meanwhile, Angola’s road and power sectors held back the per capita growth 
rate by 0.2 percentage points each over the same period.  
Looking ahead, simulations suggest that if Angola’s infrastructure could be improved to the level of 
the African leader, Mauritius, annual per capita growth rates would be 2.9 percentage points higher than 
they are at present. This impact would come from an increase in power-generating capacity and improved 
road infrastructure (figure 2b).  
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Figure 1. Infrastructure’s contribution to annual per capita economic growth, actual and potential 
a. Infrastructure’s contribution between 2001 and 2005 
 
 
b. Potential contributions 
 
 
Source: Calderón 2009. 
The state of Angola’s infrastructure 
Angola’s population of around 18.5 million is unequally distributed across the country. The most 
densely populated areas surround the capital Luanda and a handful of other major cities. Overall, the  
coast and the southern and eastern parts of the country are less populated than the interior highlands 
(figure 2a). The spatial distribution of population is influenced by the presence of vast natural resources 
and agricultural potential. Angola’s interior highlands (figure 2c), abundant in water resources, are well 
suited for agriculture. The south and southeast are dry savanna; the far north is covered by rain forest. 
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minerals that are found in the western and central parts of the country (figure 2d). The distribution of 
Angola’s infrastructure networks broadly follows the pattern of population and natural resource 
distribution, with a greater density of transport, power, and ICT infrastructure along the western half of 
the country (figure 2e, 2f, 2g, 2h).  
Angola has quite an extensive road network. The main links in the western half of the country appear 
to be in reasonable condition, while roads on the eastern side are sparser and more dilapidated. In terms of 
regional integration, Angola’s most salient international road corridor connects the country to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia in the east, although the infrastructure is in poor 
condition. 
Angola lacks anything that could be described as a national power grid, let alone regional 
interconnections. There are a number of isolated power systems, with minimal local transmission links, 
although a backbone is planned to link the main power assets in the north and south of the country. 
Angola’s national fiber-optic backbone is already much further developed than its power grid, linking up 
all the major towns on the western side of the country. Hydraulic infrastructure and irrigation is 
conspicuously absent. 
This report begins by reviewing the main achievements and challenges in each of Angola’s major 
infrastructure sectors, with the key findings summarized in table 1. Thereafter, attention will turn to the 
problem of how to finance Angola’s outstanding infrastructure needs. 
Table 1. The achievements and challenges of Angola’s infrastructure sectors 
  Achievements  Challenges 
Air transport  Significant growth in seats.  Increasing competition in the sector. 
Improving safety oversight. 
ICT  Improved access to ICT. 
Sector reform. 
Increasing competition in the sector. 
Increasing internet penetration. 
Power  Major expansion in generation capacity and 
rehabilitation of existing power assets. 
Decreased delay in connecting to grid. 
Increasing low power access rates. 
Improving power supply reliability. 
Decreasing cost of connecting to grid. 
Developing transmission infrastructure. 
Raising tariffs to cost recovery level. 
Improving operational efficiency of utilities. 
Ports  Recent expansion and rehabilitation.  Decreasing congestion. 
Boosting efficiency and performance. 
Rails  A number of railways exist.  Rehabilitating 70 percent of the rails. 
Increasing freight and labor productivity. 
Introducing private participation. 
Roads  Huge investment program.  Improving quality and density of roads. 
Establishing operational road fund and fuel levy. 
Improving the condition of regional corridor, as well as 
delays and cost of border crossing. 
Water and sanitation  Reduced reliance on open defecation.  Decreasing high rates of water-borne disease. 
Improving water supply systems. 
Improving efficiency of the utilities. 
Raising tariffs to cost-recovery levels. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on findings of this report. 
Note: ICT = information and communication technology. 
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c. Natural resources 
 
d.  Power, and natural resources 
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e. Type and condition of roads, rail, and ports, and population 
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f. ICT and population 
 
g. Water, cropland extent, and airports 
 
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Angola (www.infrastructureafrica.org/library/doc/698/angola-interactive-infrastructure-atlas). 
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Power 
Achievements 
Angola has been making substantial investments in the power sector since 2002 to restore and 
reconstruct the infrastructure that was destroyed during the civil war. Recent estimates from Empresa 
Nacional de Electricidade (ENE)—Angola’s major power-generating company—indicate that these 
investments led to an increase in generation capacity from around 830 MW in 2002 to over 1,200 MW in 
2008 (World Bank 2010a) (table 2). In terms of per capita generating capacity, Angola fares better than 
the average African fragile state or resource-rich country. Angola has 70 MW per million people 
compared to resource-rich or low-income fragile countries, which have only 43 or 46 MW per million 
people, respectively (table 1). 
Furthermore, a relatively high share of Angola’s generation capacity is actually operational. In 2008 
almost 1,000 MW or 80 percent of the installed power generation capacity was operational. This is 
higher, on average, than resource-rich countries, where roughly 66 percent was operational and generating 
power. Thus, Angola has been able to rapidly ramp up its power production over the past decade. This 
increased generation and operational capacity facilitated a 13 percent average annual growth in power 
production between 1999 and 2008. As of 2008 around 4,133 GWh of power was produced, a steep 
increase compared to 1999 production levels of 1,295 GWh (World Bank 2010a).  
The delay involved in obtaining an electricity connection has fallen dramatically since 2007. 
Investment climate surveys in 2007 reported that firms encountered delays of over two months in Luanda 
and over six months in other parts of Angola in order to obtain a new electricity connection (World Bank 
2007b). But Angola has achieved tremendous progress in this area—firms in 2010 recorded only a seven-
day delay, on average, in obtaining a power connection (World Bank 2010b). 
Challenges 
But increased investments in power infrastructure have not necessarily translated into widespread 
electrification. As of 2008 only a little more than 30 percent of Angola’s population benefited from access 
to power, lower than the 46 percent average for the nation’s resource-rich African peers. No 
disaggregated data are available on the levels of rural versus urban access in Angola (World Bank 2010a), 
but it is known that Luanda consumes around two-thirds of the nation’s electricity, suggesting relatively 
high access in the urban and peri-urban areas of the capital. Further, at least 85 percent of Luanda’s 
municipalities indicate that they use electricity for lighting, corroborating that the availability of 
electricity in urban areas is high (World Bank 2005). It is estimated that about half of the connected 
residential consumers in Luanda are served by informal providers who pay a bulk tariff of around 
US$0.04 cents per kilowatt-hour to the utility and resell to consumers at approximately three times this 
price. Given the limited attention given to rural electrification to date, rural access can be expected to be 
quite low. 
   ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
  11 
Table 2. Benchmarking Angola’s power infrastructure 










Access to electricity, national  % of population  30  15  33  50  46 
Installed generation capacity per capita  MW per million people  70  46  20  799  43 
Firms that find power a constraint for business  % of firms  46  67  52  31  56 
Firms with own generator  % of firms  68  33  41  18  63 
Outages per year  days  36  11.1  41  5.6  15 
Outages, value lost, annually   % of sales  13  5  6  2  7 
Collection rate, reported by utility, electricity  % of billing  42     92  91  70 
Cost-recovery ratio, historical  %   15  85  89  85  97 
Revenue per unit  US cents per KWh  2.5  3  14  13  13 
System losses   % of generation  18–23  24  24  20  52 
Total hidden costs  % of revenue  375   544  69  0  168 
      Angola  Predominantly hydropower 
Other developing 
countries 
Effective power tariff  Residential at 100 kWh  3.72  10.27 
5.0–10.0  Effective power tariff  Commercial at 100 kWh  4.88  11.73 
Effective power tariff  Industrial at 50.000 kWh  4.88  11.39 
Source: Data for aggregates for low-income, middle-income, and fragile states based on data for 2005 unless indicated otherwise 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/tools/data). Data for access to electricity, installed and operational capacity, collection rate, and system losses 
provided by World Bank specialists (2011). Data on revenue per unit, cost recovery, and hidden costs based on information from World Bank 
(2010a). Firms that find power to be a constraint taken from World Bank (2007b). Value lost and outages per year is from enterprise surveys 
and is from World Bank (2010b). 
Note: kWh = kilowatt-hour; MW = megawatts 
 
Additionally, even though power availability has improved, service continues to be relatively 
unreliable, with growing recourse to emergency rentals to safeguard supply. Despite the steep growth in 
power production, World Bank investment climate surveys in 2007 reported that around 84 percent of 
firms experience power outages, lasting around 21 hours, on average 8 times a month. Large firms 
indicated a more acute problem, with at least 16 outages a month; the manufacturing sector overall was 
the worst affected. The problems were reportedly worse outside Luanda (World Bank 2007b). In 2010 
results from the enterprise showed marginal improvement, with Angolan firms enduring a modestly better 
6 outages a month lasting around 14 hours (World Bank 2010b). Overall 36 days were spent without 
electricity, twice the time endured by other resource-rich African countries.  
Inadequate power supply is a huge impediment to private sector activity. In 2007 at least 68 percent 
of Angolan firms surveyed in the larger cities had their own generation capacity to compensate for 
intermittent grid supply. Outside of Luanda, 90 percent of firms owned their own generators, producing 
almost a third of their own power needs. Recent estimates suggest that at least 900 MW of self-generation 
capacity has been put in place by Angola’s firms. This is not far short of ENE’s generation capacity, and 
much higher than in many other resource-rich countries. Around 5 percent of firms’ annual turnover was 
lost due to electricity shortages, which is typical of resource-rich countries in Africa (World Bank 2007b). 
In 2010 the impact of unreliable power supply was reportedly worse, such that the value lost due to erratic 
power supply had increased substantially to 13 percent, much higher than for the peer group (World Bank 
2010b). Self-generation by firms is largely diesel-based and can cost as much as $0.40 per kilowatt-hour ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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(kWh) to operate in spite of the relatively low diesel prices in Angola (table 2)—or roughly twice ENE’s 
production costs. Most of the time, self-generation is operated on stand-by mode, as a backup for frequent 
outages. To ensure steady supply, however, it is not uncommon to have self-generation operating 
continuously, thereby adding significantly to the costs of power. 
Further, while the time taken to obtain an electricity connection has reduced in recent years, new 
connections still impose a large cost to firms in Angola. The cost for firms to obtain an electricity 
connection is ten times the country’s per capita income. Although these costs are lower than elsewhere in 
Africa, they nonetheless represent a significant burden on firms (World Bank 2010c).  
Figure 3. Angola’s fragmented power infrastructure network 
 
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Angola (www.infrastructureafrica.org/library/doc/698/angola-interactive-infrastructure-atlas). 
 
Poor access and erratic power supply can be attributed to the fragmented nature of Angola’s power 
system as well as deficiencies in existing transmission and distribution infrastructure. Angola has three 
major electric systems that are not interconnected, each operating independently. The north, south, and 
central systems each have their own networks linking generation sources to load centers (figure 3). The 
northern system, serving Luanda, accounts for over 80 percent of the country’s generation assets, while 
the central and southern systems have less than 10 percent each. While blackouts are commonplace in 
Luanda, they are even more so in the central and southern systems. Ironically, the north actually has a 
surplus of energy—its blackouts are less due to lack of energy than to operational challenges associated 
with managing the system during peak-load periods. The absence of a national transmission backbone ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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prevents surplus power in the north being wheeled to the center and south of the country. This problem of 
regional imbalances in power supply and demand will only become more accentuated as new generation 
capacity comes on stream, underscoring the importance of improving the transmission network. 
Power production costs, at $0.16 per kWh, are relatively high by the standards of neighboring 
countries in southern Africa (figure 4). The higher costs in Angola, particularly when compared to its 
neighbors, are partly explained by the country’s reliance on oil-based generation for about 40 percent of 
its production, at a cost of around $0.30 per kWh.  
Figure 4. The costs of power production in Angola are relatively high 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan (2010-); based on data from 2005–06. Angola costs derived based on IFC staff estimates and are for 
2010.  
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo; kWh = kilowatt-hour. 
 
Meanwhile, tariffs, at $0.042 per kWh, are among the lowest in Africa, covering only a small fraction 
of costs (figure 5). Power tariffs in Angola are low even by the standards of other hydropower-dependent 
countries, whose power tariffs typically stand closer to $0.10 per kWh. Angola has not revised its power 
tariffs since 2004. These low power prices, although meant to benefit the poor, largely subsidize the 
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Figure 5. The average Angolan consumer pays extremely low prices for power 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia and Shkaratan (2010); Angola data from IFC staff estimates and for 2011. 
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
In part due to these low tariffs, Angola’s power sector faces a dire financial situation. The two central 
actors in the sector are the power utilities ENE and Empresa de Distribuição de Electricidade (EDEL). 
ENE produces power and distributes around 30 percent of it in the south and central region. EDEL buys 
power from ENE and distributes the remaining 70 percent in the north of the country. Both companies 
receive direct subsidies from government as well as implicit subsidies through low fuel prices. Angola 
charges very nominal prices for fuel when compared to other oil-producing nations or to its oil-importing 
neighbors (table 3). Recent data on the magnitude of direct subsidies are not available. But the historical 
record shows that the power utilities were unable to attain 
financial sustainability despite the major subsidies they were 
receiving. In 2000 ENE received a direct subsidy of $150 million 
plus fuel subsidies that together covered 25 percent of its costs, 
and still registered losses of over $4 million. In 2001 EDEL’s 
revenues from sales did not cover the cost of energy purchase 
from ENE even after the direct subsidy from the government was 
included, resulting in financial losses of $15 million.   
One problem is the cumulative underpricing of energy along 
the production chain.  
Cost-recovery challenges 
plague Angola’s power system 
(table 4). ENE produces power at 
$0.16 per kWh. Around 70 
percent of the power is sold to 
EDEL at a bulk supply tariff of 
$0.022 per kWh, recovering only 
14 percent of production costs. 
The other 30 percent of ENE’s 
power is distributed to customers in the central and southern areas of Angola at a price of $0.042 cents per 























































































































































































































































Table 3. Angola pays very little for diesel 
per liter compared to several oil-producing 
neighbors  
US cents/liter  2004  2006  2008 
Angola  29  36  39 
Cameroon  83  107  104 
Congo, Rep. of  59  67  57 
Namibia  65  87  88 
South Africa  80  84  45 
Source: GTZ 2009. 
Table 4. Power underpricing per kilowatt-hour (US cents per kWh) 
  
Cost of 
production/purchase  EDEL  Consumer 
ENE  16  2.2  4.2 
Underpricing by ENE    13.8  11.8 
EDEL  7    4.2 
Underpricing by EDEL      2.8 
Source: AICD estimates based on World Bank (2010a) and IFC staff estimates. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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transmission and distribution of power amounts to approximately $0.07 per kWh, yet the tariff charged to 
the final consumer is $0.042 per kWh, recovering only 60 percent of costs (table 4). 
Furthermore, distribution losses are substantial. Estimates of ENE’s technical and nontechnical losses 
are 18–23 percent. Losses are much worse for EDEL, totaling 36 percent, of which 15 percent is 
attributable to technical losses and 21 percent to nontechnical losses. Nontechnical losses are largely due 
to pilfering through illegal connections, lack of meters, and faulty billing systems. Recent estimates 
suggest that overall losses were reduced from 40 percent in 2006 to around 32 percent in 2010. While this 
represents important progress, losses remain very high in absolute terms.  
In addition, the nonpayment of 
power bills is rampant. The 
pervasive culture of nonpayment 
found in Angola seriously impedes 
financial performance. The 
government estimates that, on 
average, only 40 percent of the energy generated is billed, and that only 42 percent of what is billed is 
collected. This collection rate is exceptionally low compared to the African peer group (table 5). While 
EDEL’s collection performance used to be much worse than ENE’s, it has improved in recent years to a 
point where the two companies have largely converged (table 7). Ironically, the collection ratio of what 
the utilities charge their end consumers, at around 70 percent, is much higher than the collection ratio 
between ENE and EDEL, which stands at only 27 percent (table 5). The trail of arrears between the 
various entities involved in the power sector starts with nonpayment by EDEL’s clients, leading to 
nonpayment for power purchased by EDEL from ENE, leading to nonpayment of fuel purchased by ENE 
from the national oil company SONAGOL. 
In total, inefficiencies contributed to a combined financial hemorrhage of $618 million for ENE and 
EDEL in 2009, with underpricing, distribution losses, and low collection ratios accounting for over $550 
million of that total. Hidden costs in the power sector have been increasing steadily since 2007. ENE 
accounts for the lion’s share of the hidden costs—almost $500 million in 2009, or 0.7 percent of GDP. 
The largest source of hidden costs for ENE is the underpricing of power, both to EDEL and to its own 
consumers. The failure of EDEL to make timely payments on its bills further augments ENE’s hidden 
costs (table 6). EDEL’s hidden costs amounted to $120 million a year in 2009, equivalent to 0.2 percent 
of GDP (table 7). Once again these costs are largely driven by underpricing, and to a lesser extent system 
losses. 
   
Table 5. Bill collection in Angola in 2008 
   ENE  % of ENE sales  EDEL 
Collections from consumers (%)  71  30  68 
Collections from EDEL (%)  27  70    
Source: World Bank 2010a.       ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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mers  EDEL 
Consu-
mers  EDEL 
Consu-
mers  EDEL 
2007  2,374  23  70  27   0.16   0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  366  542 
2008  2,920  23  70  27  0.16   0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  450  542 
2009  3,236  23  70  27  0.16   0.04  0.02  0.04  0.02  498  542 
Source: Derived based on Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Angola calculations derived from IFC staff estimates and World Bank 
(2010a). 
Note: kWh = kilowatt-hour. 


































2005  1001  46  54  0.06   0.02  0.04  59  239 
2006  1252  40  61  0.06   0.03  0.04  67  203 
2007  1475  36  61  0.07   0.03  0.04  91  214 
2008  1814  36  68  0.07   0.03  0.04  102  171 
2009  2200  36  68  0.06   0.03  0.04  120  164 
Source: Derived based on Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009); Angola calculations derived from IFC staff estimates and World Bank 
(2010a). 
Note: kWh = kilowatt-hour; GWh = gigawatt-hour. 
Figure 6. Massive hidden costs in the power sector in Angola 
a)  ENE              b. EDEL 
 
Source: AICD calculations. 
 
The magnitude of hidden costs in Angola’s power sector, at about 400 percent of revenues, is second 
only to the Democratic Republic of Congo (figure 7). ENE’s hidden costs are 542 percent of its revenue 
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of Congo, hidden costs reach 600 percent of sector revenues, but for most other countries in the region, 
hidden costs rarely exceed 200 percent of sector revenues. 
Figure 7. The hidden costs of Angola’s power sector are among the worst on the continent 
 
Source: Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2009.  
Note: DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
 
Although Angola’s power costs can be expected to fall in the medium term, today’s tariffs will 
nonetheless need to increase if the sector is to reach financial equilibrium. Angola faces relatively high 
power costs as of today, but there is reason to believe these costs will fall over time. Angola still has vast 
unexploited hydropower potential as well as abundant gas reserves estimated at 10 trillion cubic feet 
(World Bank 2010a). Both of these primary sources of energy could be harnessed to produce power at a 
much lower cost than today. Backing up Angola’s largely hydro-based system with gas-fired generation, 
as opposed to the current oil-fired generation, would prove to be a great deal more cost effective. In 
addition, as Angola develops its national power grid it will be in a position to interconnect with the 
Southern Africa Power Pool, opening up access to a range of other cost-effective sources of power, most 
notably the Inga power scheme in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Even taking all of these factors into 
account, Angola’s long-run marginal cost of power could still be expected to amount to around $0.11 per 
kWh, which is almost three times today’s tariffs. This points to the importance  of moving tariffs on to a 
more sustainable trajectory.  
Figure 8. Cost recovery will remain a questionable prospect even in the future  
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Angola is making extraordinary efforts to reconstruct its dilapidated road infrastructure. The level of 
public spending on roads increased dramatically in recent years, averaging a staggering $2.8 billion over 
the period 2005–09. This makes Angola one of the highest spenders on road infrastructure in Africa. This 
spending is about four times the estimated $423 million annual longer-term requirement for road-network 
preservation, reflecting Angola’s desire to reconstruct its road infrastructure on an accelerated timetable 
(figure 9). According to budget figures, as much as two-thirds of this total is classified as maintenance. 
This is somewhat surprising; however, the boundary between maintenance and rehabilitation activities 
can be a blurry one, and so this may simply reflect issues of expenditure classification.  
Figure 9. Angola’s spending on roads is more than sufficient to cover maintenance and rehabilitation needs 
 
Source: Gwilliam and others 2008. 
Challenges 
Angola’s road network is in very poor condition. Angola’s road network covers 62,560 km. Of this 
total length, the classified network (primary, secondary, and tertiary) accounts for 58 percent or 36,399 
km. The rest is the urban network of 11,057 km and the unclassified network of 15,104 km. Most of the 
traffic is concentrated in the area surrounding Luanda (figure 10), but overall traffic levels are 
comparatively low (table 8). The inadequate condition of the roads caused by years of destruction and 
undermaintenance is one of the factors contributing to the low traffic levels. As much as 58 percent of 
Angola’s classified network and 40 percent of its rural network is in poor condition, which is among the 
worst road condition statistics in Africa (figures 10 and 11). Only 17 percent of classified and urban roads 
are paved. Poor road quality in combination with very low road density and a lack of bridges—as many 
were destroyed or imbedded with mines during the war—makes some of the provincial capitals 
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Figure 10. Angola’s roads: Type and condition versus traffic 
a. Type and condition of roads, rail, and ports, and population 
 
b. Road traffic, airports, and natural resources 
 
Source: AICD Interactive Infrastructure Atlas for Angola (www.infrastructureafrica.org). ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Table 8. Angola’s road indicators benchmarked against Africa’s low- and middle-income countries  











Classified road network density  km/1,000 km2 of land area  88  98  29  278 
Total road network density [1]  km/1,000 km2 of land area  132  128  41  318 
GIS Rural accessibility   % of rural pop. within 2 km of all-season road  25  20  31  31 
Main road network condition [2]  % in good or fair condition  72  68  58  86 
Rural road network condition [3]  % in good or fair condition   53  61  40  65 
Classified paved road traffic   AADT  1,131  1,408  884  2,451 
Classified unpaved road traffic   AADT  57  54  10  107 
Primary network overengineering  % of primary network paved with 300 AADT 
or less  30  15  42  18 
Perceived transport quality [4]  % firms identifying transport as major 
business constraint  13  27  —  20 
Source: AICD Road Sector Database on 40 Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 [1] Total network includes the classified and estimates of unclassified and urban networks. 
[2] Main network for most countries is defined as result of adding the primary and secondary networks. 
[3] Rural network is generally defined as the tertiary network and does not include the unclassified roads. 
[4] Source: World Bank—IFC Enterprise Surveys on 32 Sub-Saharan Africa countries. 
GIS = geographic information system; AADT = average annual daily traffic. 
— = Not available. 
 
Figure 11. The condition of Angola’s main road network benchmarked against others in southern Africa 
 
Source: AICD Road Sector Database on southern Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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The quality of Angola’s regional road corridors is also poor, making the country’s regional 
connectivity with the broader SADC economic area difficult. This situation both prevents Angola from 
developing regional trade with surrounding countries and limits surrounding countries from making 
greater use of the Port of Luanda (see figure 13).  
Transportation represents an important bottleneck for Angola’s economy. Poor road infrastructure 
and transport logistics slow Angola’s overall economic development. Angola is one of the worst 
performers in the world according to the 2010 Logistics Performance Index (LPI). Its manufacturing 
sector depends on imports for as much as 40 percent of inputs, which can be difficult and expensive to 
procure given the poor quality of the roads. Moreover, around 2.1 percent of the production of 
manufacturing firms is lost in transit, more than in any other African country (World Bank 2007). It takes 
49–53
1  days to export or import goods, among the longest times in Africa. Road access is particularly 
problematic for firms outside Luanda.  
For all of these reasons, Angola urgently needs to establish an operational road fund. The country’s 
current extraordinary spending on the road sector is entirely budget-financed. Such high levels of public 
funding are not sustainable in the long term, and there is the risk that today’s heavy investments may not 
be adequately maintained in the future. It is therefore critical for Angola to work toward the establishment 
of a road fund resourced from a fuel levy and other road-user charges. The optimal fuel levy needed for 
long-term road-network sustainability in Angola would be on the order of $0.15 per liter of fuel, which is 
toward the middle of the range for African countries (figure 12). But currently, gasoline and diesel prices 
are heavily subsidized by the state and there is no mechanism for fuel levy collection.  
Figure 12. Angola’s public contribution exceeds the maintenance and rehabilitation needs of its road network 
 
Source: Gwilliam and others, 2008 . 
                                                 
1 www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/trading-across-borders. 
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Figure 13. Angola’s poor road conditions constrain SADC’s regional connectivity 
 
Source: AICD SADC Interactive Infrastructure Atlas (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/maps) . 
Note: Southern African Development Community.  
Rail 
Achievements  
Angola has three operational railways in place. The railway systems once carried 9.3 million metric 
tonnes of freight to Angola’s ports in Namibe, Luanda, Benguela, and Amboim, before the civil war but 
freight levels are currently low (World Bank 2005). Similar to its other transport infrastructure, Angola’s 
railways suffered during the 27 years of war: at present, only 30 percent of the total rail network is 
operating (table 9). The railways are currently under rehabilitation with support from several parties, 
including Chinese and Indian entities.  
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Table 9. Rail networks in Angola 
      Lines (km)  %  Gauge 
Company  Port  Region  Total  Operating  operating  (mm) 
Caminhos de Ferro de Benguela (CFB)  Lobito  Central  1,333  246  18  1,067 
Caminhos de Ferro de Luanda (CFL)  Luanda  Northern  479  181  38  1,067 
Caminhos de Ferro de Moçamedes 
(CFM) 
Namibe  Southern  907  425  47  1,067 
Amboim  Amboim  Central  122  0  0  760 
Total      2,841  852  30  - 
Source: Bullock 2009. 
Challenges 
Angola will need to rehabilitate or rebuild the 60 percent of its current rail network that is currently 
out of operation. This is a tremendous task, since in many cases it requires expensive works to remove 
mines and complete replacement of the obsolete or deteriorated rails. In addition, the performance of 
existing lines is very poor. Freight density and labor productivity are low in Angola in comparison to 
other African countries, and will need to be tackled through institutional reform (table 10).  















































































































































































































Concessioned (1)/ state run (0)  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Freight density (1,000 tonne-
km/km)  469  827  90  270  663  364  475  2,427  406  902 
Passenger density (1,000 
passenger-km/km)  —  —  38  103  44  44  33  60  92  166 
Labor productivity (1,000 traffic 
units per employee)  580  722  131  710  281  —  484  3,308  502  390 
Locomotive productivity (million 
traffic units per locomotive)  30  41  3  25  13  —  25  33  25  8 
Carriage productivity (1,000 
passenger-km per carriage) 
4,046  2,391  1,176  3,333  750  —  —  —  3,286  — 
Wagon productivity (1,000 net 
tonne-km per wagon) 
950  987  82  260  476  —  805  913  377  195 
Freight yield (US cents/tonne-km)  —  —  6  5  3  3  —  —  4  — 
Passenger yield (US 
cents/passenger-km)  —  —  1  0.9  0.5  1  —  —  1  — 
Source: Bullock 2009. Derived from AICD rail operator database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: * With 2.5 passenger-km equivalent to 1 traffic unit, 1 tonne-km equivalent to 1 traffic unit. 
— = Not available. 
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Ports 
Achievements 
The Port of Luanda offers natural deep-sea access to Angola and serves as the nation’s main route for 
international trade. The existing port consists of 1,150 meters of quays (six berths), with an additional five 
berths on a finger pier. The current draft at the port is 10.5 meters, allowing a maximum vessel size of 
about 30,000 deadweight tonnes. But the depth in Luanda Bay exceeds 20 meters, potentially allowing 
vessels larger than 150,000 deadweight tonnes to enter the bay as long as dredging activities are sustained 
(Nathan 2010). 
The Port of Luanda is benefitting from the recent rehabilitation, expansion, and upgrading  financed 
by a number of investors. There has been ongoing modernization of the second container terminal, 
operated by Sogester, at a cost of $56.5 million since July 2010. The Sogester terminal commissioned 
three new mobile container cranes in 2010. The port has recently acquired three new tugs to speed up the 
mooring and departure of vessels, and thus increase port capacity. Luanda has also begun to move ships 
offshore and offload cargo onto barges using ship’s gear (Nathan 2010). 
Challenges 
Burgeoning demand over the past few years has resulted in serious congestion at the Port of Luanda, 
with traffic volumes increasing more than tenfold, from 30,000 to 346,000. As a major transit port not 
only for Angolan goods but also for the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, Luanda 
is one of the fastest-growing ports in Africa, witnessing a dramatic compound growth rate of around 30 
percent over the past decade. This growth has created handling constraints leading to port congestion for 
both general cargo and container traffic (figure 14). The congestion problem is responsible for a number 
of the shortcomings in the port’s performance, problems that can only be addressed once capacity 
increases. 
Figure 14. Ratio of current demand to reported capacity 
a. General cargo   b. Container traffic 
   
Source: AICD Ports Database 2008. 
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The Port of Luanda is notorious for long delays and poor performance relative to other ports in 
Africa. Container dwell times, at 12 days, are twice as long as Durban, Africa’s best-performing port, and 
are rivaled only by ports in Mozambique that perform slightly worse. Truck cycle time, at 14 hours, is 
over twice as long as other southern African ports. Crane productivity is less than half that of other 
southern African ports. 
Port-handling charges in Angola are among  the highest in Africa. The container cargo-handling 
charge is almost five times what is charged at the Port of Mombasa (Kenya) and 25 percent higher than 
Durban (South Africa). Bulk cargo-handling charges are also on the higher end of what is observed in 
African ports. 
Deterred by the lengthy delays and high prices, Angolan traffic is increasingly using the Port of 
Walvis Bay in Namibia as the main gateway to the sea. Walvis Bay is located 2,100 km to the south of 
Luanda, yet improvements in road and rail infrastructure linking the two cities have made the port more 
accessible to the Angolan market. The fact that port users increasingly prefer this long-distance road 
journey and its associated border-crossing delays is testimony to the severity of the problems facing the 
Port of Luanda. 
Efforts that are now under way should help to ease the congestion problems at the Port of Luanda. A 
dry port has been developed at Viana, about 30 km inland from the port, connected by road and rail. The 
Viana dry port is in the process of being further expanded at a cost of about $70 million. A $136 million 
contract was signed in 2009 to improve road access to the port and to reclaim additional land for 
development around the port area. Further, a new container port is also being planned for a 2,400 hectare 
site, at Barra do Dande, north of Luanda, which is in the process of being cleared of land mines (Nathan 
2010). 

















































































































Container dwell time—average (days)  6  4  7  6  8  12  20  22  5  7  25 
Truck time for receipt and delivery of cargo (hours)  5  5  2  5  3  14  7  4  5  5  8 
Container crane productivity (container per hour)  18  15  8  15     7  10  11  10  20  13 
Prices                                   
Container-cargo-handling charge ($ per TEU)  258  258  258  258  110  320  125  155  68  275  168 
General-cargo-handling charge ($ per tonne)     8  8  8  15  9  7  6  7  14  10 
Source: AICD Ports Database 2008. 
Note: TEU = 20-foot equivalent unit. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Air transport 
Achievements 
Angola’s air transport seat capacity grew significantly between 2001 and 2007 (figure 15, table 12). 
The decline in capacity for 2009 may be more of a function of missing domestic capacity figures than a 
true slowing of growth, since both intercontinental traffic and international traffic within Africa still show 
growth in spite of the global recession. Angola’s restructured national airline, TAAG Angolan Airlines, 
seems to be expanding its routes and fleet, which includes several Boeing 777s. Reflecting cultural ties, 
flights to Portugal and Brazil feature prominently in the country’s pattern of intercontinental connectivity. 
Figure 15. Evolution of seats and city pairs in Angola 
a. Seats  b. City pairs 
   
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: As reported to international reservation systems. 
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Table 12. Benchmarking air transport indicators for Angola and selected countries
2 
Country   Angola  DRC  Zambia  Mozambiqu
e  Namibia  Republic of 
Congo 
Traffic (2007)              
Domestic seats (seats per year)  1,199,016  327,988  437,658  1,144,644  84,162  443,634 
Seats for international travel within Africa (seats per year)  484,179  468,217  1,459,766  582,836  877,812  351,882 
Seats for intercontinental travel (seats per year)  588,978  193,414  113,217  91,637  242,736  117,962 
Seats available per capita  0.134  0.24  0.168  0.087  0.574  0.016 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index—air transport market (%)  33.25  22.65  17.53  31.54  39.39  30.79 
Quality             
Percent of seat-km in newer aircraft   59.7  74.7  63.8  57.0  79.0  73.3 
Percent of seat-km in medium or smaller aircraft  13.9  39.3  50.6  42.5  28.3  40.5 
Percent of carriers passing IATA/IOSA Audit 
1 (as of 
2009)  0  0  100.0  100.0  0 
FAA/IASA Audit Status  No audit  Failed  No audit  No audit  No audit  No audit 
Source: Bofinger 2009. Derived from AICD national database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market 
share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers. An HHI of 100 indicates the market is a monopoly; the 
lower the HHI, the more diluted the market power exerted by one company/agent. 
FAA = U.S. Federal Aviation Administration; IASA = International Aviation Safety Assessment; IATA = International Air Transport Association; 
IOSA = IATA International Safety Audit; DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Challenges  
There is relatively limited competition in the air transport sector. The dominant position of the 
national carrier TAAG keeps the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index for Angola’s air transport market 
relatively high. But this is not to suggest that Angola relies on TAAG alone. Namibian carriers also 
provide much of the capacity. 
Rather than capacity or competition, Angola’s biggest challenge in the air transport sector is safety 
oversight. All airlines from Angola are on the European Union (EU) blacklist, with exceptions for 
specified 777s and one 737 operated by TAAG. The latest International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) audit results still show significant room for improvement, with Angola being below international 
averages in nearly all categories except primary aviation legislation.     
   
                                                 
2 All data are as of 2007, based on estimations and computations of scheduled advertised seats, as published by the 
Diio SRS Analyzer. This captures 98 percent of worldwide traffic, but a percentage of African traffic is not captured 
by these data.  ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Water supply and sanitation 
Achievements 
Angola has made important progress in reducing reliance on open defecation. In 2007, 24 percent of the 
population practiced open defecation compared to 49 percent in 2001. Even though the improvement has 
been significant, the percentage is still high, at almost twice the level of middle-income countries (MICs) 
(table 13).  








    Mid-2000s  2001  2007  Mid-2000s 
Access to piped water  % pop  13  13  18  52.1 
Access to stand posts  % pop  12  14  10  18.9 
Access to wells/boreholes  % pop  47  39  31  6.0 
Access to surface water [1]  % pop  27  34  40  13.0 
Access to septic thanks  % pop  13  17  31  40.8 
Access to improved latrines  % pop  37  18  22  1.4 
Access to traditional latrines  % pop  22  16  21  30.4 
Open defecation  % pop  28  49  24  14.3 
      2005  2009   
Domestic water consumption  liter/capita/day  115  75  56  154 
Revenue collection  % sales  60  85  44  100 
Distribution losses  % production  40  62  61  27 
Cost recovery [2]  % total costs  67  81  72  81 
Operating cost recovery  % operating costs  94  114  100  145 
Labor costs  connections per employee  96  25  34  369 
Total hidden costs as % of revenue  %  194      140 








2005  2009     
Average effective tariff  U.S. cents per cubic meter  120  230  60–120  3–60 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey 2006/7 and AICD water and sanitation utilities database 
(www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data).  
Note:  Access figures from the 2001 Multiple Indicator Survey and 2007 Malaria Indicator Survey. 
[1] Surface water includes rivers, lakes, and ponds in the vicinity as the main source of water supply, as well as other nonimproved sources of 
water such as water from vendors and rain water. 
[2] Cost recovery is estimated based on the assumption of a capital cost of 40 cents per cubic meter. 
 
The reduction in open defecation has been achieved by the expansion of higher-end forms of 
sanitation in urban areas and traditional latrines in rural areas. Access to septic tanks almost doubled 
between 2001 and 2007, from 17 to 31 percent. In urban areas about 4.8 percent of the population has 
been gaining access to septic tanks each year, an exceptionally high rate of expansion that mirrors the 
country’s rapid urbanization process (figure 16b). The use of improved latrines increased from 18 percent ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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to 22 percent over the same year (table 13), particularly in urban areas. Use of traditional latrines also 
increased from 16 to 21 percent between 2001 and 2007, mostly in rural areas, where 2.2 percent of the 
population has been gaining access to this form of sanitation each year (figure 16b).  
Figure 16. Angola has made important progress in the sanitation sector but not in the water supply sector 
Population gaining access per year, 1998–2006 
a. Water  b. Sanitation 
   
Source: WHO Joint Monitoring Program 2010, from the 2001 Multiple Indicator Survey and 2007 Malaria Indicator Survey. 
Challenges 
Angola still has the highest rate of diarrheal disease in the world, with 114 years of life lost to diarrheal 
diseases for every 1,000 Angolans. In 2006 a cholera epidemic hit Luanda, affecting 23,000 people and 
causing almost 300 deaths (LUPP 2007). Contaminated water, inadequate storm-water drainage, deficient 
operation of the limited sewer system, and high reliance on open defecation have resulted in high—and 
steadily increasing—rates of water- and excreta-related diseases (USAID 2009). The situation is 
particularly bad in periurban informal settings and in refugee camps, where more than a million internally 
displaced persons still reside.  
Angola’s urban population is growing at an increasingly fast rate (4.7 percent per year), and the 
current piped and stand-pipe water supply and management system cannot keep up with the demand for 
domestic water consumption. This gap is increasingly being filled by private water vendors selling largely 
untreated water. The supply of water from tankers rose from 10 percent of the population in 2001 to 37 
percent in 2007 (figure 17). Indeed, in periurban areas of Luanda, 70 percent of residents purchased their 
water from water vendors. This water is extremely expensive, with prices varying from $4/m
3 close to the 
distributional area of the water tank to $20 in more distant areas (Cain, Daly, and Robson 2002),  leading 
to a significant increase in the number of small-scale operators (figure 17). Most of the water comes from 


















































































































Septic tanks Improved Latrines
Traditional Latrines Open Defecation
Annualized GrowthANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
  30 
the ANGOMENHA water are expected to stop at the small water-treatment station for chlorine treatment 
at a cost of $0.10/m
3, but there is no enforcement system in place (Development Workshop—Angola, 
2007). The water trucks then sell the water to an estimated 10,000 fixed-point water vendors, primarily 
households that have built water-storage tanks; these households in turn sell the water to the rest of the 
population (Keener, Luengo, and Banerjee 2009).  
 Due to its largely untreated nature, 
water from vendors counts as surface 
water (table 13). This accounts for 
statistics showing a growing reliance 
on surface water in Angola, increasing 
from 34 to 40 percent between 2001 
and 2007. Again, this was mainly 
driven by the trend in urban areas, 
where the use of surface water grew 
from 22 to 39 percent; in fact the share 
of the urban population moving to 
surface-water reliance each year was as 
high as 3.8 percent (figure 16a).  
Most urban centers in Angola are 
served by precarious water supply 
systems unable to cope with rapid 
urbanization. Most of these systems 
were damaged during the war and have 
suffered from lack of proper 
maintenance. On average 34 liters per 
capita per day are provided to urban residents, but in fact the distribution ranges from about 80 liters per 
capita per day in the most privileged areas to 3 liters per capita per day in the poorest (World Bank 2008). 
This situation should begin to improve in the near future, since the government is investing heavily to 
rehabilitate treatment facilities, pumping stations, transmission mains, and distribution networks in major 
urban areas throughout Angola, and working on parallel institutional reforms to make the sector more 
sustainable (World Bank 2008). 
Luanda’s utility provider, Empresa Provincial de Agua de Luanda (EPAL),
3 is struggling with aging 
infrastructure built to support a much smaller population. The utility’s deteriorating performance puts it 
well behind those in other resource-rich countries. The water supply system in Luanda was built in 
colonial times for a population of 500,000 people, yet by 2007 Luanda’s population was estimated to be 
over 5 million. Utility water consumption per capita between 2005 and 2009 decreased from 75 to 56 
liters per day. Even so, putting Luanda well ahead of the national average for water consumption.. 
Revenue collection dropped from 85 percent of the billings in 2005 to 44 percent in 2009, below the 60 
percent average for resource-rich countries (table 1). Whereas distribution losses remain stagnant, at 
around 60 percent of production, they are well above the average 40 percent for utilities in resource-rich 
                                                 
3 Empresa Pública de Água de Luanda. 
Figure 17. Evolution of water truck operators 
Cumulative increase in the number of small scale operators between 1995 and 2005 
 
Source: Development Workshop—Angola 2007. 
Note: SHO = small-scale high-size operator; SSO = small-scale single operator; 
SMO = small-scale medium-size operator;. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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countries and three times above the international benchmark of 20 percent. EPAL revenues covered only 
72 percent of total costs in 2009 vis-à-vis 81 percent in 2005. Despite an increase in connections per 
employee from 25 in 2005 to 34 in 2009, EPAL’s labor productivity is just one-third of the average for 
utilities in resource-rich countries and well behind the international benchmark of 200 connections per 
employee.  
The burden of EPAL’s inefficiencies has increased over time. By comparing key performance 
indicators of the utilities for which data are available against those of a well-performing utility or norm, 
we are able to quantify—in monetary terms—the key inefficiencies affecting each utility. Here three 
types of hidden costs are considered: first, utilities unable to collect 100 percent of their bills (collection 
inefficiencies); second, utilities incurring losses on their water distributional network above the norm of 
20 percent of production (losses); and, third, utilities whose average effective tariffs are not enough to 
cover the cost of producing a cubic meter of water (underpricing). On this basis, the hidden costs of 
EPAL grew from 98 percent of revenues in 2005 to 132 percent in 2009. The largest source of hidden 
costs were high distributional losses, followed by low collection rates. In absolute terms this represents an 
almost threefold increase in losses, from $45 million in 2005 to $125 million in 2009 (table 14). When 
compared to the performance of other southern African utilities, EPAL’s hidden costs are among the 
highest in the region (figure 18). 
Figure 18. Benchmarking the hidden costs of EPAL against those of selected countries in southern Africa 
Percentage of revenues 
a. EPAL’s hidden costs  b. Hidden costs of select water utilities in southern Africa 
   
Source: Derived from Banerjee and others (2008b) and Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
 
In the rural context, water supply is provided mainly by wells and boreholes that do not guarantee the 
provision of safe water. Around 50 percent of rural dwellers are supplied by water coming from 4,000 
wells and boreholes countrywide (figure 19). Many of these are not working due to shortages of spare 
parts or fuel for pumps (USAID 2009). Low rural-road accessibility and the slow process of clearing mines 
left over from the civil war make it harder to develop rural water supply systems. The government has 
launched an ambitious rural strategy aimed at increasing water supply coverage to periurban and rural 
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2005  99  62  86  1.5  1.2  45  98 
2006  100  60  82  1.3  1.5  37  63 
2007  94  65  58  2.4  2.3  77  100 
2008  98  60  48  2.5  2.5  100  100 
2009  105  61  45  2.7  2.3  125  132 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Note: Total cost is estimated based on the assumption of a capital cost of 40 cents per cubic meter. 
 
Figure 19. Urban versus rural access to water supply and sanitation, 2007 
a. Water supply  b. Sanitation  
   
Source: AICD water supply and sanitation utilities database (www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/data). 
Note: Access figures calculated by AICD using data the 2007 Malaria Indicator Survey.  
Information and communication technology 
Achievements 
Access to ICT has improved markedly since the end of Angola’s civil war in the early 2000s. Mobile 
penetration rose from less than 1 subscriber per 100 people in 2000 to almost 50 subscribers per 100 
people in 2009. Fixed-telephone access has risen marginally, but this is offset to some extent by the 
development of wireless access (table 15) (Narain 2009). 
Angola has made reforms to its telecommunications sector. The Ministry of Telecommunications and 
Information Technology is responsible for overall sector oversight, while the Angolan Institute of 
Communications (INACOM), created in 1999, is the industry regulator. Two mobile operators have been 
licensed: Movicel, an Angolan firm, and Unitel, partly owned by Portugal Telecom, which entered the 
market in April 2001. In addition to the incumbent, four fixed-line operators have been licensed 
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Table 15. Benchmarking ICT indicators 










2008  Angola 2009 
GSM coverage  % population under signal  —  31  77  56  31 
International bandwidth   bits/person   0.1  20  153  34  — 
Internet   users/100 people   0.1  5.3  13.9  5.1  6.4 
Landline   subscribers/100 people   0.5  0.6  13.6  1.5  0.7 















Price of monthly mobile basket  12.45  11.8  8.4  11.8  11.32 
Price of monthly fixed-line basket  —  21.1  4.8  11.6  20.3 
Price of monthly fixed broadband   —  119  31.4  100  77 
Price of a call to the United States per minute  1.2  1.3  —  0.8  1.2 
Price of an inter-Africa call per minute  —  1.4  —  1.0  1.3 
Source: Adapted from Angola Telecom, Inacom, Unitel, AICD, and World Bank ICT at-a-Glance. 
— = Not available.  
Challenges  
Despite sector reforms, the actual level of competition remains low. Mobile competition is limited; 
the two operators providing service use two different technologies (CDMA
4 in the case of Movicel and 
GSM
5 in the case of Unitel), making it more costly for subscribers to switch networks because of the need 
to purchase new equipment. While there is a high de jure level of competition in the fixed-line market, in 
reality, the new operators have delayed getting off the ground. Despite being licensed years back, they 
have only recently started to provide services. Movicel spun off from Angola Telecom in 2010, with 80 
percent sold to investors (Almeida 2009). Meanwhile, Angola Telecom remains fully government owned. 
The impact of limited competition is apparent in pricing: Angola’s ICT tariffs are above both the Sub-
Saharan African and lower-middle-income group averages (table 15, bottom). 
Angola’s domestic backbone consists of microwave, VSAT,
6 and as of recently fiber-optic cable. The 
first phase of the national fiber-optic backbone linking 18 provincial capitals through 6,000 km of fiber-
optic cable is scheduled to be concluded in 2011 (Macaohub, November 17, 2010). A notable feature of 
the domestic backbone is the 1,800-km ADONES portion stretching along the country’s Atlantic 
coastline (WFN Strategies 2009). Angola was one of the few African countries to obtain access to an 
international undersea fiber-optic cable when it connected to the South Atlantic 3 (SAT-3) cable in 2002. 
Despite this, Internet access prices have remained high, in part due to Angola Telecom’s monopoly over 
the cable. The country is slated to connect to two more cables in the near future: the Africa Coast to 
Europe (ACE) cable and the West Africa Cable System (WACS). A consortium made up of the country’s 
                                                 
4 Code division multiple access. 
5 Global system for mobile communications. 
6 Very small aperture terminal. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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leading operators has reportedly been established for developing the connection to undersea cables, which 
presumably will enhance open access (TelecomPaper, June 5, 2009).  
Internet penetration in Angola is average for the southern African region (figure 20). There are no 
official data on the number of Internet users in Angola. But according to the government, there were some 
300,000 subscribers in 2008; assuming 3 users to a subscription, this amounts to about 900,000 users or 
5.4 percent of the total population.
7  
Figure 20. Angola’s Internet market benchmarked against southern African peers  
a. Internet service trends, Angola, 2000–08   b. Internet service trends, southern Africa, 2008 
   
Source:  Minges 2008. 
 
Several of the new fixed-line operators have launched WiMAX
8 networks, which, along with Angola 
Telecom’s ADSL
9 service, provides a degree of fixed broadband competition. Movicel recently launched 
a GSM network that should enhance intermodal competition in the mobile market.
10 It is likely that it will 
also launch mobile broadband based on HSDPA
11 technology to complement its high-speed wireless EV-
DO
12 network. Unitel has also launched mobile broadband services. Given these developments and the 
availability of international access through up to three undersea fiber-optic cables in the near future, the 
prognosis for Angola’s broadband infrastructure is positive. The government will need to enhance 
                                                 
7 Conselho de Ministros,  ―Programa Executivo do Sector para 2009,‖ Resolu￧ão n.º 33/09 de 7 de Maio. 
8 Worldwide interoperability for microwave access. 
9 Asymmetric digital subscriber line. 
10 www.consuladogeral-angola.hk/sub/Press/Press_2010_1201_3.html. 
11 High-speed downlink packet access. 
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competition to lower prices and spread availability so that access to high-speed Internet is not limited to 
companies and well-off individuals.  
Financing Angola’s infrastructure 
To meet its most pressing infrastructure needs and to catch up with developing countries in other parts of 
the world, Angola needs to expand its infrastructure assets in key areas (table 16). The targets outlined in 
table 16 are purely illustrative, but they represent a level of aspiration that is not unreasonable. Developed 
in  a  standardized  way  across  African  countries,  they  allow  for  cross-country  comparisons  of  the 
affordability of meeting targets that can be modified or delayed as needed to achieve financial balance.  
Table 16. Illustrative investment targets for infrastructure in Angola 
  Economic target  Social target 
ICT  Install fiber-optic links to neighboring capitals and submarine cable. 
 
Provide universal access to GSM signal and 
public broadband facilities. 
Power  Develop additional 2,028 hectares of large-scale and 305 hectares of 
economically viable small-scale irrigation. 
  
n.a. 
Transport  Develop 8 MW of new-generation capacity and 2,120 MW 
interconnectors (no-trade scenario).  
Increase electrification to 24.1 percent (42.4 
percent urban and 9.1 percent rural). 
WSS  Achieve regional (national) connectivity with good-quality 2-lane (1-
lane) paved road. 
Provide rural road access to 42 percent of the 
highest-value agricultural land, and urban road 
access within 500 meters. 
Source: Mayer and others 2009 ; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others 2009. 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology; GSM = global system for mobile communications. 
n.a. = Not available. 
 
Meeting these illustrative infrastructure targets for Angola would cost around $2 billion per year over 
a decade. About 70 percent of this total relates to capital expenditure, and the remaining 30 percent to 
operating expenditure, suggesting that Angola’s priority should be investment, though it must not neglect 
to  maintain  its  assets.  In  the  case  of  transport  and  irrigation,  investment  consists  primarily  of  asset 
rehabilitation, whereas for other infrastructure sectors investment should be focused on expanding the 
asset base. 
The largest share of spending needs relates to the power sector, followed by water and sanitation and 
transport. The power sector requires sustained spending of $785 million annually due to major capital 
investment needs. The second-highest needs are in the water and sanitation sector, with annual spending 
needs of $574 million needed to meet the MDGs (table 17). 
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Table 17. Infrastructure spending needs in Angola, 2006–15 
$ million per year 
Sector  New 




maintenance  Total needs 
ICT  169  0  169  119  288 
Irrigation  1  16  16  2  18 
Power   558  50  608  177  785 
Transport   107  156  263  160  423 
Water supply and sanitation  233  128  361  213  574 
Total  1,067  350  1,417  671  2,088 
Source: Mayer and others 2009; Rosnes and Vennemo 2009; Carruthers, Krishnamani, and Murray 2009; You and others, 2009. 
Derived from models that are available online at www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/tools/models. 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
 
While Angola’s infrastructure spending needs are comparatively high in absolute terms, they look 
manageable relative to the country’s burgeoning GDP. Expressing infrastructure spending needs as a 
percentage of GDP gives a sense of the economic burden involved in providing adequate infrastructure. 
For Angola, this burden amounts to no more than 7 percent of GDP, much lower than most other African 
countries (figure 21). Infrastructure investment would absorb around 5 percent of GDP—only around 
one-third of what China invested in infrastructure during the mid-2000s.  
Figure 21. Angola’s infrastructure spending needs are comparatively low relative to GDP 
Estimated infrastructure spending needed to meet targets, as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2009. 
Note: LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African 
States; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M = operations and maintenance; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure. 
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Angola already spends a sizable  $4.3 billion per year to meet its infrastructure needs  (table 18). 
Around 57 percent of the total is allocated to operations and maintenance, while the remaining 43 percent 
is  capital  expenditure.  Operating  expenditure  is  entirely  covered  from  budgetary  and  state-owned 
enterprise  (SOE)  resources,  and  payments  by  infrastructure  users.  Seventy-four  percent  of  capital 
expenditure is funded by the public sector, though significant shares of capital investments are provided 
by the private sector (7 percent) and financiers other than member countries in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (18 percent). Official development assistance (ODA) 
for infrastructure is negligible (2 percent). 
Table 18. Financial flows to Angola’s infrastructure 
$ million per year 
 
O&M  Capital expenditure 
Total 
spending  Public sector 
Public 
sector  ODA 
Non-OECD 
financiers  PPI 
Total 
CAPEX 
ICT  97  102  2  40  110  253  350 
Irrigation  2  5  0  0  0  5  7 
Power   295  184  6  81  9  280  575 
Transport   1,815  1,026  10  127  3  1,166  2,981 
WSS  233  22  16  70  0  109  341 
Total  2,442  1,339  34  318  121  1,813  4,255 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: O&M = operations and maintenance; ODA = official development assistance; PPI = private participation in infrastructure; CAPEX = 
capital expenditure; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information 
and communication technology. 
The public sector figures are averages of actual spending for 2007–09 in the case of government data. In the case of state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), the average spans over 2004–08 and in some cases 2004–09. Funding from external financiers is averaged over the 2002–07 period. 
 
Angola’s existing spending amounts to almost 14 percent of its 2005 GDP (figure 22). This represents 
quite a high level of effort, well above the averages for the country’s regional peer groups. While total 
spending is high, the balance between investment and operating expenditure is unusual. While Angola’s 
capital  spending  of  6  percent  of  GDP  is  almost  on  par  with  its  resource-rich  peers,  its  operating 
expenditure at 8 percent of GDP is several times the level found in other resource-rich countries. 
Angola’s pattern of capital investment in infrastructure differs from that of comparator countries. It is 
heavily skewed toward transport (taking 70 percent), leaving much smaller shares for power (14 percent), 
ICT (8 percent), and water supply and sanitation (8 percent). Relative to its peer group, Angola is much 
more reliant on public funding for capital investments for the transport, power, and ICT sectors. The level 
of recent public investment in the transport sector is particularly high. Non-OECD financing is important 
across the board in Angola. Private sector investment has been limited to the ICT sector, while other 
resource-rich countries have received private flows also to other infrastructure sectors. Angola’s 
investment efforts in ICT, power, and water supply and sanitation are lower than the respective average 
for resource-rich countries. By contrast, investment in transport is substantially higher (figure 23).  
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Figure 22. Angola’s existing infrastructure spending is quite high 
 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: LIC = low-income country; MIC = middle-income country; ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; GDP = gross domestic product; O&M= operations and maintenance; CAPEX = capital expenditure. 
 
Figure 23. Capital investment in infrastructure in Angola and comparator countries 
Investment in infrastructure sectors as percentage of GDP, by source
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
Note: Private investment includes self-financing by households.  
ODA = official development assistance; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; ICT = information and 
communication technology; GDP = gross domestic product; WSS = water supply and sanitation 
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How much more can be done within the existing resource envelope? 
As much as $1.3 billion of additional resources—equivalent to almost 5 percent of Angola’s GDP—
could be recovered each year by improving efficiency (table 19). The largest source of inefficiency is low 
capital budget execution, leaving $573 million allocated to infrastructure unspent each year. Given the 
magnitude of the road-sector investment program currently under way in Angola, which amounts to an 
average of $2.9 billion annually, it makes sense that budget execution would be an issue. The second 
serious source of inefficiency is underrecovery of costs in the power sector, which drains a further $475 
million a year. Distribution losses and collection inefficiencies across both the power and water sectors 
are also substantial, together absorbing $252 million each year. 
Table 19. Angola’s potential gains from greater operational efficiency 
 
ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Underrecovery of costs  —  n.a.  475  n.a.  16  491 
Overstaffing  n.a.  —  n.a.  —  n.a.  n.a. 
Distribution losses  —  —  65  —  57  122 
Undercollection  —  n.a.  78  n.a.  53  131 
Low budget execution  78  0  92  401  3  573 
Total  78  0  709  401  128  1,317 
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
— = Not available. 
n.a. = Not applicable. 
 
Underpricing of power and water in Angola is less burdensome than in other low-income, fragile 
countries in GDP terms. Nevertheless, it is very high in absolute terms and remains a huge problem for 
Angola. Both power utilities, ENE and EDEL, charge tariffs of $0.042/kWh, recovering barely a quarter 
of the full costs of power production estimated at $0.16/kWh. Furthermore, there is a huge subsidy 
implicit in the bulk-supply tariff at which ENE sells power to EDEL. Overall, the hidden costs due to 
undercharging in Angola’s power sectors amount to 0.7 percent of GDP. In the water sector, as of 2009, 
EPAL’s average tariffs stood at $2.3/m
3 versus the estimated $2.7/m
3 average cost-recovery tariff. But 
given the relatively small reach of the water utility, the macroeconomic burden, at 0.02 percent of GDP, is 
relatively small (figure 24). 
Cost-recovery tariffs for power look to be affordable to a majority of the population. With a tariff of 
$0.16/kWh and a monthly subsistence consumption of 50 kWh, the associated utility bill comes to $8 per 
month  in  Angola.  Detailed  information  on  the  income  distribution  of  Angolan  households  was  not 
available. But based on the distribution of household budgets in other Sub-Saharan low-income countries 
(LICs), one can conclude that monthly power utility bills at these levels would likely be affordable to 
around 60 percent of the population (figure 25). A more limited level of subsistence power consumption 
of 25 kWh/month—enough to meet only the most basic needs—would cost $4 per month and would be 
affordable to 80 percent of the population. Given that only 30 percent of the population has access to 
electricity, it would appear that Angola has scope to increase electricity coverage at cost-recovery prices 
before affordability becomes a serious impediment. ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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Figure 24. Underpricing of power and water in Angola and other low-income, resource-rich countries 
Financial burden of underpricing as percentage of GDP 
 
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009).  
 Note: GDP = gross domestic product. 
 
Water costs are so exorbitantly high that cost-recovery tariffs could present affordability problems; 
therefore the policy priority should be the reduction of costs. While Angola has some of the lowest power 
tariffs in Africa, its water tariffs are among the highest in Africa. Angola’s water tariffs at $2.30/m
3 are 
more than double those found in most other African countries, and second only to Cape Verde, whose 
costs of $3–$5/m
3 are more understandable due to the archipelago’s high energy costs and heavy reliance 
on desalination. Achieving full cost-recovery would entail raising tariffs to $2.7 /m
3. At these prices, it 
would cost $27 to consume 10  m
3/month, which would be affordable to less than 20 percent of  the 
population. A more limited level of subsistence consumption of 4 m
3/month for water would cost $10.8 
per month, which would still be affordable to only 40 percent of the population. These findings suggest 
that for the water sector, the priority needs to be reducing costs rather than raising tariffs. 
Figure 25. Affordability of water and power 
 
Source: Banerjee and others 2009.  












































































































































Monthly utility bill (US$) Angola
LIC
Average cost of power is 4 USD/Month per 25 kwh or 8 USD/Month per 50 kwh subsistence 
consumption
Average cost of water is 10.84 USD/Month per 4 m3 or 27.1 USD/Month per 10 m3 
subsistence consumption
Power cost-recovery tariff is 0.16 USD/kwh
Water cost-recovery tariff is 2.71 USD/m3ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The operational inefficiencies of power and water utilities cost Angola a further $252 million a year, 
equivalent to 0.4 percent of GDP. The annual value of inefficiencies in the power sector (at $143 million) 
is higher than that in the water sector (at $109 million). Both power utilities, ENE and EDEL, and the 
water utility EPAL, can benefit from improving bill collection and reducing distributional losses. In 2009 
ENE collected only 27 percent of its billings to EDEL and only 70 percent of its billing to end users. 
EDEL reported collecting 68 percent of its billings to consumers. EPAL managed to collect only 45 
percent of its billings for water services. If all utilities were able to collect 100 percent of billings, they 
would receive an additional $131 million per year—$78 million in power and $53 million in the water 
sector. ENE lost 23 percent of power distributed to end users in 2009, while EDEL’s distributional losses 
stood at 36 percent. When compared to the best-practice benchmark of 10 percent, the overall distribution 
losses result in $65 million in annual potential savings. Nonrevenue water in the water sector stood at a 
high 61 percent of total water production in 2009, three times the best-practice benchmark of 20 percent. 
Nonrevenue water inefficiencies cost Angola about $57 million a year, equivalent to 0.08 percent of GDP. 
In the power sector, the burden of utility inefficiencies in terms of GDP in Angola is lower than for the 
benchmark countries, but in water, the burden is slightly higher (figure 26).  
Figure 26. The burden of inefficiency carried by Angola’s power and water utilities  
a. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the power sector, as a 
percentage of GDP 
b. Uncollected bills and unaccounted losses in the water sector, as a 
percentage of GDP  
   
Source: Derived from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster (2009). 
Annual funding gap 
Angola’s infrastructure funding gap amounts to $115 million per year, or about 0.4 percent of GDP, 
once efficiencies are captured. Most of the gap is found in the water and sanitation sector (table 20). Most 
of the other sectors do not face any funding gap once all inefficiencies are taken into account. But in the 
power, water, and ICT sectors there is some potential for redistributing spending between capital and 
operating expenditure. As noted above, transport spending substantially exceeds the benchmark level 
established here, due to a government preference for accelerating reconstruction of the national road 
network. The remaining funding gap is very small relative to the size of Angola’s economy, and could 
easily be filled by a modest reallocation of resources from the transport to the water and sanitation sector; 
particularly in view of the low budget execution in the transport sector. Furthermore, the funding gap for 
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than previously used (such as stand posts, boreholes, and improved latrines) for meeting the MDGs, 
thereby saving $165 million annually. 
Table 20. Funding gaps, by sector  
$ millions 
  ICT  Irrigation  Power  Transport  WSS  Total 
Needs   (288)  (18)  (785)  (423)  (574)  (2,088) 
Spending*  266   7   457   423   322   1,474  
Within sector reallocation  22   0   118   0   20   160  
Potential efficiency gains  78   0   709   401   128   1,317  
Funding gap   —  (11)  —  —   (104)  (115) 
Across sectors reallocation potential  62   0   0   2,558   0   2,620  
Source: Derived from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009). 
Note: Potential overspending across sectors is not included in the calculation of the funding gap, because it cannot be assumed that it would be 
applied toward other infrastructure sectors. 
WSS = water supply and sanitation; ICT = information and communication technology. 
* traced to needs. 
— = Not available. 
What else can be done?  
While Angola’s infrastructure reconstruction needs are large in absolute terms, they look manageable 
relative to the size of the country’s fast-growing economy. Moreover, Angola has already amply 
demonstrated its commitment to channeling significant volumes of petroleum rents toward infrastructure 
development. A significant expansion in power generation capacity has taken place, and a huge road 
investment program is currently under way. Consequently, Angola is one of a very few African countries 
that does not really face any significant infrastructure funding gap. 
But this conclusion is contingent on Angola capturing the sizeable $1.3 billion of resources that are 
each year being lost to inefficiency, equivalent to almost 5 percent of GDP. Two policy measures alone 
would  suffice  to  capture  the  bulk  of  these  resources,  and  deserve  priority  attention. The  first  is  the 
increase of power tariffs toward cost-recovery levels. The second is an easing of the pace of the road-
sector investment program to reduce the problem of underexecution of budgetary resources. 
Given the urgent pressure to reconstruct Angola’s infrastructure platforms, there is some evidence 
that decisions have not always been optimal. For example, the expansion of generation capacity has not 
been matched by reinforcements in transmission and distribution that would allow the power to flow 
through to end users. And the scale of Angola’s road-investment program seems to have outstripped the 
implementation capacity of the key sector institutions. There is also evidence that the water and sanitation 
sector may not yet have received as much attention as it deserves. 
In addition, Angola’s considerable achievements in infrastructure expansion over the past few years 
have  been  almost  entirely  funded  from  public  investment,  with  significant  support  from  non-OECD 
financiers. Angola has only captured about 0.4 percent of GDP in private investment for infrastructure, 
compared with numerous African peers that have managed to capture 1–3 percent of GDP in private 
investment (figure 27). Given the size and vibrancy of Angola’s economy it ought to be feasible in the ANGOLA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A CONTINENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
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medium term to attract a more significant volume of private finance, particularly in the energy sector (for 
the development of a gas-fired plant), thereby helping to liberate public funds for other pressing social 
needs. 
Figure 27. Angola needs to attract more private investment, in particular beyond the ICT sector 
 
Source: PPI Database, World Bank, 2010. 
Note: GDP = gross domestic product; ICT = information and communication technology. 
Selecting  optimal  technology  choices  could  reduce  the  funding  gap  by  three-quarters.  Adopting 
lower-cost technologies could substantially reduce the cost of meeting infrastructure targets, and reduce 
the funding gap. If Angola could strategically expand its power trade, this would reduce the resource 
deficit of the power sector, lowering power needs from $785 million per year to $485 million per year, 
leading to savings of $300 million annually. Similarly, meeting transport connectivity standards using 
lower-cost road-surfacing technologies (such as single-surface treatment) could reduce the associated 
price tag from $423 million to $241 million. The overall savings from these measures would amount to 
$647 million, and would eliminate Angola’s funding gap (table 21). 
Table 21. Potential savings from innovation 
$ millions 
  Before 
innovation  After innovation  Savings 
Savings as % of 
sector funding 
gap 
Savings as % of 
total 
funding gap 
Power trade  785  485  300  no gap  260 
WSS appropriate technology  574  409  165  158  143 
Roads appropriate technology  423  241  183  no gap  158 
Total  1,783  1,135  647  no gap  562 
Source: Derived from Carruthers and others, 2009 and Banerjee and others, 2008 
Note: WSS = water supply and sanitation. 
 
It will likely be necessary for Angola to consider planning for a period longer than a decade to reach 
the illustrative infrastructure targets here outlined. If the huge efficiency potential could be fully captured, 
Angola could meet the posited targets today, assuming current level of spending. But under business-as-
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